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United States Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia once famously 
opined that, “. . . law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual 
fatherhood.”1  Of course, we know that many children today are being raised 
in households where their primary paternal figure is a stepfather, and their 
natural father, who is their legal father, may or may not exercise some 
quantum of visitation/access.2  Moreover, many American jurisdictions today 
allow same-sex couples to adopt, so that a child has either two mothers or two 
fathers.3  But the situation which Justice Scalia was addressing involved a 
child whose mother was married at the time of conception, who apparently 
was the product of her mother’s affair with another man, and where the 
mother’s husband had forgiven all and accepted the child as his own.4  Justice 
Scalia could not imagine that the law, or nature, would permit a child to have 
three parents, in that case a mother and two fathers.  Indeed, in the typical 
same-sex adoption case, either there is no known father because one of the 
lesbian partners was inseminated by an anonymous donor,5 or a known donor 
has agreed to terminate his parental rights.6  In either of those scenarios, a 
child ends up with the normal number of parents:  two. 
* Visiting Professor, Buckingham University Law School, and Professor of Law and 
Co-Director of the Family Law Clinic, The Pennsylvania State University Dickinson 
School of Law, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, USA.  The author gratefully acknowledges the 
assistance of John R Fenstermacher, Esq, Mechanicsburg, PA, and Timothy M Ayres, 
Esq, Johnston, PA, in providing certain background documents and information, as 
well as Prof Vanessa Gruben, University of Ottawa, for providing information on 
Canadian law. 
1 Michael H v Gerald D, 109 S Ct 2333, 2339 (1989). 
2 See, e g, Charles v Stehlik, 744 A 2d 1255 (Pa 2000). 
3 See Adoption of B L VB and E L VB, 628 A 2d 1271 (Vt 1993).  But see Adoption of 
Luke, 640 N W 2d 374 (Neb 2002); Lofton v Sec of Dept of Children and Family 
Services, 358 F2d 804 (11th Cir 2004). 
4 Michael H, above n 1 at 2337-8. 
5 See, e g, B L VB, above n 3.  
6 See, e g, Adoption of Tammy 619 N E 2d 315 (Mass 1993). 
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The recent case of Jacob v Shultz-Jacob appears to break the mold and at 
least suggest, if not definitively hold, that children in Pennsylvania can have 
three legal parents, that is three people who share custodial rights and support 
duties.7  Jacob also appears to be the first appellate authority anywhere in the 
United States for such a proposition. 
The underlying facts in Jacob are relatively straightforward.  Two women, 
Jodilynn Jacob and Jennifer Shultz-Jacob, began living together in an intimate 
relationship in 1996.  They underwent a “commitment ceremony” in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and entered into a “civil union” in Vermont.8  A 
Vermont “civil union” is akin to a British “civil partnership” under the CPA 
2004; i.e., for same-sex couples it is a marriage in all but name.9  However, 
Pennsylvania does not recognize a same-sex marriage even if legally entered 
into elsewhere, and it is therefore highly doubtful that a Pennsylvania court 
would give legal effect to a Vermont civil union.10
The subject children were conceived by Jodilynn through artificial 
insemination from a known sperm donor, Carl Frampton.11  It is clear that 
Jennifer never adopted the children.  However, they were raised in Jodilynn 
and Jennifer's household from their births (June 20, 1998, and April 6, 2000)12 
until February 2006 when, the intimate relationship having ended, Jodilynn 
left with the children.13  Both custody and support litigation ensued, involving 
Jodilynn, Jennifer and Carl. 
 
LITIGATION AT THE TRIAL COURT LEVEL 
 
In the custody litigation, the trial court awarded Jodilynn and Jennifer 
shared legal custody of the children.14  Under Pennsylvania law, legal custody 
7 Jacob v Shultz-Jacob, 923 A2d 473, 2007 Pa Super Lexis 957 (Pa Super 2007). 
8 Id  923 A2d at 476. 
9 Vermont enacted civil unions in response to the decision of the Vermont Supreme 
Court in Baker v State, 170 Vt 194, 744 A 2d 864 (1999), holding that same-sex 
couples in Vermont could not be denied the “common benefits” available to opposite-
sex couples through marriage.  See 1999 Vermont House Bill No 847, codified at Vt 
Stat Ann Tit 15 §§ 1201-1207 and Tit 18 §§ 5160-5169. 
10 It is hereby declared to be the strong and longstanding public policy of this 
Commonwealth that marriage shall be between one man and one woman.  A marriage 
between persons of the same sex which was entered into in another state or foreign 
jurisdiction, even if valid where entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth. 23 
Pa Cons Stat § 1704 (2007). 
11 Jacob, above n 7, at 476.  Jodilynn also adopted two other children, who were her 
nephews, who were not the primary focus of litigation. 
12 Jacob v Shultz-Jacob, C P Dauph, Domestic Relations Section, Docket No 00603-
DR-06 (Sept 4, 2007). 
13 Jacob, above n 7, at 476. 
14 Ibid. 
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means, "The right to make major decisions affecting the best interest of a 
minor child, including, but not limited to, medical, religious and educational 
decisions."15  The trial court awarded Jodilynn primary physical custody of 
the children, and awarded partial physical custody to both Jennifer and Carl.16  
Partial physical custody is, "the right to take possession of a child away from 
the custodial parent for a certain period of time."17
In the child support litigation, Jodilynn sued Jennifer, asserting that 
Jennifer was liable to support the children although she had not adopted them.  
Jennifer did not deny her liability for child support, but asked the trial court to 
join Carl as an additional defendant, arguing that he, too, was liable.  The 
court denied Jennifer's request for "joinder" of Carl, finding that Jennifer by 
her actions had accepted responsibility for providing support for the children.  
In a decision explaining the denial of joinder, the trial judge first noted that 
there had been a stipulation of counsel that Carl had never been in loco 
parentis to the children.  The judge also noted the absence of any legislation 
in Pennsylvania addressing “the rights and obligations of the myriad of parties 
potentially involved in the assisted conception of children.”  The judge was 
concerned that to hold Carl “liable for support would create a situation in 
which three parties/parents would be liable for support,” something simply 
not envisioned in Pennsylvania law.  The judge made a prediction which must 
have seemed safe at the time: 
 
“This court is unaware of any appellate or lower court 
decision in Pennsylvania that have (sic) held three parties 
liable for support and would predict that our courts would 
never so require.”18
 
Jennifer appealed both the custody and support orders, and the cases were 




The Superior Court's analysis of Jennifer's custody claims was brief.  All 
the litigants below had stipulated that Jennifer stands in loco parentis to the 
children.19  The doctrine of in loco parentis standing for asserting custodial 
rights had been addressed in 2001 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in T B 
15 23 Pa Cons Stat § 5302 (2007). 
16 Jacob, above  n 7, at 476. 
17 23 Pa Cons Stat §5302 (2007). 
18 Jacob v Schultz-Jacob, In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County, PA, No 
603 DR 2006 (Nov 21, 2006) (slip op). 
19 Jacob, above n. 7, at 477. 
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v L R M 20 In T B, as in Jacob, one party to a lesbian relationship was 
impregnated by a known sperm donor and the resulting child was jointly 
raised by the lesbian couple, but subsequently the biological mother left the 
relationship and assumed full authority over the child.  When the biological 
mother refused her ex-partner all access to the child, the ex-partner sued for 
shared legal and partial custody and visitation.21 The biological mother argued 
that her ex-partner lacked standing to assert such rights.  The lower courts 
found that the ex-partner did have in loco parentis standing, and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed: 
 
“The phrase in loco parentis refers to a person who puts oneself  (sic) 
in the situation of a lawful parent by assuming the obligations incident 
to the parental relationship without going through the formality of a 
legal adoption.  The status of in loco parentis embodies two ideas; 
first, the assumption of a parental status, and, second, the discharge of 
parental duties. . . .  The rights and liabilities arising out of an in loco 
parentis relationship are, as the words imply, exactly the same as 
between parent and child. . . .”22
 
Confusingly, although the Court opined that a non-parent with in loco 
parentis standing has exactly the same rights and responsibilities as a parent, 
it later contradicted itself and noted that it had recently reaffirmed "that where 
a custody dispute is between a biological parent and a third party, the burden 
of proof is not evenly balanced and that the evidentiary scale is tipped hard to 
the biological parent's side."23
There is one critical distinction between the facts in T B and the facts in 
Jacob.  In T B, “The sperm donor's parental rights were terminated after the 
child was born.”24  Hence the courts that dealt with T B and L R M did not 
have to concern themselves with the Solomon-like possibility of splitting the 
child into thirds. 
In Jacob, Jennifer essentially argued that the trial court had erred in not 
granting her primary custody of the children.25  She had presented testimony 
from an expert witness (a psychologist), “that absent the possibility of an 
20 T B v L R M, 786 A 2d 913 (Pa 2001). 
21 In Pennsylvania, “visitation” is, “the right to visit a child, (but) the term does not 
include the right, to remove a child from the custodial parent's control.”  23 Pa Cons 
Stat 5302 (2007). 
22 T B, above n 20, at 916-917. 
23 Ibid, at 919, n 8, citing Charles v Stehlik, n 2, above. 
24 T B, above, n 20, at 915, n 1. 
25 Ibid. 
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'ideal' arrangement, that is, shared custody,26 primary custody should be 
awarded to her."27  Jennifer cited the recent case of Jones v Jones in which the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court had upheld the granting of primary physical 
custody of two children to a woman in exactly Jennifer's position, i.e., the 
lesbian ex-partner of the biological mother.28  Interestingly, in Jones the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court referred to the ex-partner as the "non-biological 
parent" of the children.  One cannot help but wonder exactly what a "non-
biological parent" is, as the court did not bother to define this new legal term 
of art.  Apparently in Pennsylvania we now have: 
 
1) Parents (biological or adoptive), 
2) Step-parents, 
3) Third parties standing in loco parentis, and 
4) Non-biological parents. 
 
To what extent category 4 overlaps categories 2 and 3, it is impossible to say. 
The Jacob court readily distinguished the instant case from the situation in 
Jones where the biological mother had “tried in every way possible to 
sabotage (her ex-partner's) relationship with the children,” “suffered from 
psychological dysfunction” and had a drinking problem.29  Jodilynn had no 
such conditions, nor any approximation of them.30  Hence, despite repeating 
the mantra that a person with in loco parentis standing has “exactly the same” 
rights arising out of that relationship “as between a parent and child,”31 the 





The more fascinating aspect of Jacob is its analysis of the child support 
issues.  The precise question on appeal was the refusal of the trial court to join 
Carl as a party defendant.  Jennifer did not contest her own liability for 
support of the children despite the fact that she had  not adopted them.  
Rather, she argued that Carl was also liable, and hence was an “indispensable 
26 Shared custody" is defined in Pennsylvania as, "An order awarding shared legal or 
shared physical custody, or both, of a child in such a way as to assure the child of 
frequent and continuing contact with and physical access to both parents." 23 Pa 
Const Stat § 5302 (2007). 
27 Jacob, above n 7, at 477. 
28 Jones v Jones, 884 A 2d 915 (Pa Super 2005). 
29 Jacob, above n 7, at 479. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid, at 477. 
32 Ibid, at 479.  
CASE COMMENTARY 
202 
                                                     
party” to the litigation.  (Since the Pennsylvania child support formula33 
simply does not contemplate a situation in which three adults would be liable 
to support the same child(ren), it was unclear whether Jennifer's support 
obligation would be lowered if Carl also were compelled to support them.) 
Pennsylvania's support law provides that, "parents are liable for the 
support of their children who are unemancipated and 18 years of age or 
younger."34  Of course, Jennifer was neither the biological nor adoptive parent 
of the children.  However, her liability was squarely premised on the analysis 
of the Superior Court in the factually similar 2002 case of L S K v H A N.35  L 
S K and H A N had had an intimate lesbian relationship for over a decade 
during which L S K bore five children (a solo and, subsequently, quadruplets) 
conceived through artificial insemination.  H A N carried out many parental 
duties, indeed acted as the stay-at-home parent when L S K returned to work 
after the births.  The couple separated, with L S K eventually moving to 
California with the children. H A N sued L S K for custody and was 
eventually found to have in loco parentis status and awarded shared legal and 
partial physical custody. 
L S K, naturally, sued H A N for child support, and H A N denied liability 
on the basis that she was neither the children's natural nor adoptive parent.  
The trial court found that H A N was equitably estopped from denying 
liability, and the Superior Court affirmed.  First, the Court noted that H A N's 
in loco parentis status conferred in the custody litigation, "embodies two 
ideas:  first, the assumption of parental status, and, second, the discharge of 
parental duties."  H A N argued that her status was similar to that of a 
stepparent and that stepparents have no legal duty to support a child after the 
dissolution of a marriage.  The Court acknowledged that stepparents normally 
cannot be sued for child support,36 but noted that if they hold themselves out 
as a child's parent they may be estopped from denying liability.37  Thus, H A 
N was properly estopped.   She and L S K had decided to start a family 
together, she had acted as a "co-parent," and she had sued for custody.  
"Although statutory law does not create a legal relationship, applying 
equitable principles we find that in order to protect the best interest of the 
children involved, both parties are to be responsible for the emotional and 
financial needs of the children."38  However, the facts in L S K differed from 
the facts in Jacob in one notable respect.  L S K had been impregnated with 
33 Pa Rules of Civil Procedure 1910.16-4. 
34 23 Pa Const Stat 4321(2) (2007). 
35 L S K v H A N, 813 A 2d 872 (Pa Super 2002). 
36 Drawbaugh v Drawbaugh, 647 A 2d 240 (Pa Super 2004). 
37 Citing Hamilton v Hamilton, 813 A 2d 403 (Pa Super 2002). 
38 H A N secondarily argued that the statewide support guidelines should not apply to 
her where her liability was based on equitable principles rather than the support act.  
The Superior Court rejected this proposition.  L S K, above n 35, at 878-9. 
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sperm from anonymous donors; therefore the five children in L S K had no 
known father to turn to for support.  Jodilynn's children had a known father:  
Carl. 
In Jacob, the trial court had cited L S K to conclude that Jennifer rather 
than Carl was responsible for child support.39  The Superior Court found such 
reliance inappropriate.  Unlike H A N, Jennifer was not denying her own 
liability for child support, only asserting that she shared her liability with Carl 
(and, of course, Jodilynn).  The Superior Court found Carl liable on two 
separate grounds:  estoppel and legal parenthood.  Carl was estopped because 
he had made significant voluntary financial contributions on the children's 
behalf and had been awarded partial custody.  Moreover, as the children's 
biological father whose rights had never been terminated in an adoption 
proceeding, Carl was statutorily liable to support them under the support law. 
The Superior Court also rejected the trial court's concern that inclusion of 
a third party in the child support calculations would create a situation never 
anticipated by the support guidelines.  The Court rather inscrutably reasoned: 
 
“We are not convinced that the calculus of support arrangements 
cannot be reformulated, for instance, applying to the guidelines 
amount set for (Jennifer) fractional shares to incorporate the 
contributions of another obligee.”40
 
Accordingly, the Superior Court vacated the support award and remanded 
the case to the trial court with directions that Carl "be joined as an 
indispensable party for a hearing at which the support obligation of each 
litigant is to be recalculated." 
 
AN IRONIC TWIST:  THREE "PARENTS" BECOME TWO 
 
When the Superior Court's decision in Jacob  was handed down on April 
30th 2007, it became national news in the United States as apparently the first 
appellate case to find that a child may essentially have three parents.41  New 
York Law School professor Arthur S. Leonard was quoted in one article as 
stating, "I'm unaware of any other state appellate court that a child has, 
simultaneously, three adults who are financially obligated to the child's 
support and are also entitled to visitation.”42   
39 Jacob, above n 7, at 480. 
40 Ibid, at 482. 
41 See "Pennsylvania Court Orders Sperm Donor to Lesbian Couple to Pay Child 
Support," Assoc Press, May 9, 2007, available at 




                                                     
But in a development of which the Superior Court was apparently 
unaware, Carl Frampton had unexpectedly died of a stroke in March 2007, a 
month after the case was submitted to the Court and a month prior to the 
Court's decision.43  This left the children with two living parents and one 
deceased parent, which is nevertheless legally different in significant ways 
from having only two parents.  On the one hand, the law is clear in 
Pennsylvania that a parent may disinherit even a minor child and that a 
deceased parent is not liable for child support.44  This is the majority rule in 
the United States, but recently it has been rethought in at least one American 
jurisdiction.45  On the other hand, Carl had an enforceable obligation to pay 
child support for the period from at least the filing of the complaint until his 
untimely demise.46
While a Pennsylvania parent may disinherit a child, even a minor child, if 
the parent dies intestate, the child is entitled to a share of the estate under the 
rules of intestacy.47
More significantly in many cases, the minor child of a deceased worker 
who has paid enough credits into the American Social Security system can 
receive survivors’ benefits on that parent’s earnings record.48
 
WAS THE SUPERIOR COURT CORRECT? 
 
The Superior Court in Jacob had no occasion to review Jennifer’s in loco 
parentis status which has been stipulated to below, nor did it review the grant 
to her of shared legal and partial physical custody.  With regard to custodial 
rights, the Court merely affirmed the trial court’s decision to vest primary 
physical custody in Jodilynn, the natural and legal mother, relying upon the 
natural parent preference in custody. 
Certainly there are cogent policy and constitutional reasons for presuming 
that it is in a child’s best interest to be with a parent (natural or adoptive) as 
opposed to a non-parent.  The United States Supreme Court has long asserted 
the primacy of parents.  Over fifty years ago, the Supreme Court stated, “It is 
43 Deceased Sperm Donor Held Liable for Child Support, A P, May 10, 2007, 
available at http://cbs3.com/topstories/local_story_130091936.html. 
44 Benson v Patterson, 830 A 2d 966 (Pa 2003). 
45 L W K v E R C, 432 Mass 438, 735 N E 2d 359 (Mass 2000).  “We conclude that 
the death of the father does not extinguish his duty to support his minor child.” 
46 “An order of support shall be effective from the date of the filing of the compliant 
or petition for modification unless the order specifies otherwise.”  Pa Rule of Civil 
Procedure 1910.17(a). 
47 See generally 20 Pa Cons Stat §§ 2102-2103 (2007). 
48 See 20 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 404.350.  Based on information 
provided by counsel, it appears that the children are receiving survivors' benefits on 
Carl’s Social Security account. 
THE DENNING LAW JOURNAL 
 
205 
                                                     
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in 
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for 
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”49
Moreover, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled in August 2002 that a 
same-sex partner may adopt the child of her partner without the biological 
parent partner giving up her own parental rights.50  Thus, from August 2002 
until their relationship ended, Jodilynn and Jennifer could have gone through 
an adoption proceeding which would have made them both legal parents of 
the children (and which presumably would have ended Carl’s status as a 
parent).  Such an adoption proceeding would have required Jodilynn’s 
agreement and active participation.  We do not know whether Jodilynn and 
Jennifer ever contemplated an adoption or what Jodilynn’s position on 
adoption would have been.  If Jodilynn had been ready, willing and able to 
have Jennifer adopt the children but Jennifer declined to do so, then equity 
would dictate that Jennifer should not be heard to complain that she did not 
stand on equal footing in the custody litigation. 
If Jodilynn objected to Jennifer’s adoption of the children, the equities 
may again favor Jodilynn in custody.  Jodilynn then could be interpreted as 
signaling that she wanted to remain in charge of the children, putting Jennifer 
on notice that the children weren’t hers and would not be hers. 
Of course there may have been myriad reasons why Jodilynn and Jennifer 
did not have Jennifer adopt the children.  They may never have thought about 
it.  They may have thought about it but assumed it was unnecessary.  They 
may not have been able to afford it.  They may not have wanted to antagonize 
Carl or lose his contributions to the children.  Carl may have voiced his 
objections.  One or both of them might have feared what eventually 
happened—that their relationship might end badly.  Or, they may just have 
never gotten around to it.  There may well have been other reasons that we 
cannot know. 
In the absence of an adoption of the children by Jennifer, it is difficult to 
fault the courts for preferring Jodilynn in the contest over primary custody.  
Arguably Jodilynn could have challenged Jennifer’s in loco parentis standing, 
given the fact of Carl’s parenthood and holding himself out as the children’s 
father.  Had Jodilynn prevailed on that argument, Jennifer would have had no 
custodial claims whatsoever.  But this litigation posture, if successful, would 
have almost certainly precluded a claim against Jennifer for child support. 
Similarly, with regard to child support, the Superior Court had no 
occasion to review the issue of Jennifer’s liability; she had conceded it.  But 
should she have?  Since the children already had two natural and legal 
parents, Jodilynn and Carl, it is less than obvious that Jennifer had a support 
49 Prince v Massachusetts, 321 US 158 (1944). 
50 In re: Adoption of R B F, 569 Pa 269, 801 A2d 1195 (2002). 
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duty than Carl.  If Jennifer had wished to adopt the children and Jodilynn had 
opposed the adoption, then equity would suggest that Jennifer not have a legal 
duty of support.  Indeed, there are other examples in the law where a person 
has custodial or visitation rights but no reciprocal support obligations.  Foster 
parents may have custody of a child but no support duty; indeed they are paid 
by the state for fostering neglected or abused children.51  Similarly, 
grandparents often have the right under state laws to seek visitation or even 
custody, with no corresponding support duty.52
Again, one can hardly fault the Superior Court for imposing support 
liability on Carl, a known biological and legal father.  Had Jennifer challenged 
her own support liability, the courts might have confronted a more difficult 
decision. 
 
CAN OR SHOULD CHILDREN HAVE THREE PARENTS? 
 
On a technical reading of Jacob, the children only have two legal parents, 
Jodilynn and Carl.  Jennifer is merely a third party standing in loco parentis to 
the children.  But, in all practicality, the decision (except for Carl’s death) 
would have left them with three parents.  If we view legal parenthood as a 
bundle of legal rights and duties, three adults shared parenthood. 
While it may well be confusing for children to have two mothers and one 
father, many children today live in blended families where they relate to either 
one or two stepparents.  Depending on the age of a child and the strength of 
the personal relationship, that child may well view a stepparent as more of a 
parent figure than a natural parent.  Nor is it reasonable to argue that a child is 
harmed by having the right to obtain support from three adults. 
As problematic as the result in Jacob is, it compares well with an 
analogous case decided by the Utah Supreme Court two months earlier, Jones 
v Barlow.53  In Jones, as in Jacob, two women entered into an intimate 
relationship and traveled to Vermont where they entered into a civil union.  
They agreed to have children, and one of them, Cheryl, was impregnated by a 
known sperm donor.  Cheryl gave birth to a daughter in October 2001.  For 
the next two years, Cheryl and her partner, Keri, co-parented the child.  
Shortly after the child’s second birthday, the couple broke up, and Cheryl left, 
taking the child with her.  When Cheryl cut off all contact between Keri and 
the child, Keri sued, seeking a “decree of custody and visitation” based on the 
claim that she had standing under the doctrine of in loco parentis.  The trial 
court found that Keri did stand in loco parentis and that visitation was in the 
51 See Smith v Organization of Faith Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U S 816, 
97 S Ct 294 (1977).  See also 16 Purdon’s Stat 2164(6) (2007). 
52 See Troxel v Granville, 530 US 57, 120 S Ct 2054 (2000). 
53 Jones v Barlow, 154 P 2d 808 (Utah 2007). 
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child’s best interest.  The court awarded Keri visitation and ordered her to 
provide financial support. 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court reversed.  The Court reasoned that 
while Keri may have stood in loco parentis to the child while she was actually 
living with the child and providing for her care, that status simply ended when 
Cheryl and the child moved out.  The Court declined to give Keri any ongoing 
rights—or duties—as a “psychological parent” or “de facto parent.”  Thus, the 
Court terminated Keri’s visitation rights and support duties without any 
consideration of the best interests of the child.  Surely this result is even less 
appealing and less protective of children than the three parent result reached 
in Jacob. 
 
THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE? 
 
Jacob, while apparently unique in the United States, has a recent 
counterpart in Canada.  In 2007, in the case of A A v B B, the Court of Appeal 
for Ontario found that a child may have two mothers and one father.54  The 
Ontario Appeals Court was unequivocal: 
 
“Five-year-old D D has three parents:  his biological father and 
mother (B B and C C, respectively) and C C’s partner, the appellant, 
A A.  A A  and C C have been in a stable same-sex union since 1990.” 
 
The trial judge in A A would have found that D D had three parents, but 
felt that he lacked authority to do so.  The Court of Appeal agreed that there 
was no such authority under Canada’s Children’s Law Reform Act, but found 
that there was authority under the court’s inherent parens patriae jurisdiction. 
A A goes beyond Jacob in one regard.  Technically, Jacob held that the 
children had only two parents and another person in loco parentis.  A A held 
that the child had three legal parents. 
However, in one regard A A was an easier case than Jacob, in that the 
parties were all in agreement that such a declaration was in the child’s best 
interest.  A A wanted the declaration in order to protect both her partner and 
the child, and the two women did not want to do an adoption which would 
have necessarily terminated the father’s rights.  Thus the court in A A was 
presented with a “win-win-win” scenario with all the parties seeking the same 
relief.  In Jacob, the three parties were clearly seeking conflicting results. 
If Jacob and A A are the wave of the future, then what is over the horizon?  
Could children have more than three adults with custodial rights and support 
duties?  What happens if Jodilynn marries and her husband starts to assume a 
54 A A v B B, [2007] O J. No 2; 2007 ON C Lexis 2. 
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parental role?  What if Jennifer does the same?55  Could children have five 
adults in the legal role of parent?  If Carl had a spouse or life partner who 
aided with the children, could the tally rise to six legally responsible parental 
figures?  Such a result could be fabulous for the financial support of children, 
at the expense of dividing their leisure time into far too many units.  (Imagine 
a child with six parental figures and twelve (or more) grandparental figures all 
seeking some quality time with that child or even battling over primary 
custody!)  This would call upon our family law system to enter into truly 




On December 27, 2007, the highest court in Pennsylvania, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, decided by the narrowest of votes the long-
awaited case of Ferguson v McKiernan,56 which calls into serious question 
the result in Jacob. 
In Ferguson, the trial court had found that Joel McKiernan and Ivonne 
Ferguson had entered into an oral contract whereby Joel would donate sperm 
to Ivonne in a clinical setting, his role as sperm donor would remain 
confidential, he would not seek custodial or visitation rights, and she would 
not seek child support.  On Valentine’s Day 1994, Joel provided a sperm 
sample at a medical center where the doctor had been told (falsely) that Joel 
was Ivonne’s husband.  The sperm was used to fertilize her eggs by IVF, 
which were then implanted.  Ivonne gave birth prematurely to twins on 
August 25, 1994.  She falsely named her estranged husband (Paul Ferguson) 
as the father on the twins’ birth certificates.  In fact, her husband had filed for 
divorce on the very day that Joel, the sperm donor, had provided his sperm at 
the medical center.  From August 1994 until mid-1999, Joel had almost no 
contact with the twins, nor did he contribute to their support in any way.  
Indeed he moved out of the area, married and had a child by his wife.  Ivonne 
contacted Joel in May 1999 and subsequently filed for child support. 
The trial court found that there was a binding contract between Joel and 
Ivonne to waive child support, but that this agreement violated public policy, 
hence was unenforceable. The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed, 
55 Both former lesbian partners involved in the L S K case subsequently got married.  
L S K, above note 35, 813 A 2d at 875, n 2. 
56 Ferguson v McKiernan, 2007 Pa Lexis 2895.  The case was argued before the Court 
over two and a half years earlier, on May 17, 2005.  There are normally seven justices 
on the Court, but the vote in Ferguson was 3-2, with former Justices Nigro and 
Newman not participating in the decision.  Hence, the three-justice majority in the 
case, rather anomalously, do not constitute a majority of the full court. 
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adopting the trial court’s analysis.57  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
now reversed the lower courts. 
The state supreme court framed the issue thus: 
 
“We are called upon to determine whether a sperm donor involved in 
a private sperm donation—i.e., one that occurs outside the context of 
an institutional sperm bank—effected through clinical rather than 
sexual means may be held liable for child support, notwithstanding the 
formation of an agreement between the donor and the donee that she 
will not hold the donor responsible for supporting the child that results 
from the arrangement.” 
 
The majority acknowledged the usual rule that parents cannot waive a 
minor child’s right to be supported.  However, the majority limited this rule to 
circumstances “of divorce and other parenting arrangements arising in the 
context of sexual relationships,” and proceeded to draw a “commonsense 
distinction between reproduction via sexual intercourse and the non-sexual 
clinical options for conception that are increasingly common in the modern 
reproductive environment.” 
Had Ivonne received IVF at a medical centre from a truly anonymous 
donor, that donor (even if later somehow identified) would clearly have had 
no liability for child support.  The facts that Ivonne chose Joel as sperm donor 
because of his characteristics rather than using the lottery system of 
anonymous donation and that Joel’s anonymity had been breached with a 
handful of family members were not enough to distinguish the instant case 
from anonymous clinical sperm donation.  Thus the agreement did not so 
offend public policy as to render it unenforceable.  While this result left the 
twins without a legal father to support them, it protected the right of women to 
choose their sperm donor, the right of sperm donors to help such women 
procreate without fear of financial liability, and, in this case, the financial 
interests of Joel’s marital child. 
It is unclear what implications the Ferguson decision has for the scenario 
in Jacob v Schultz-Jacob, should it recur.  There is no direct impact as the 
Jacob case was not appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  The 
Ferguson majority posited a continuum of situations, as follows: 
 
“Thus, two potential cases at the extremes of an increasingly 
complicated continuum present themselves:  dissolution of a 
relationship (or a mere sexual encounter) that produces a child via 
intercourse, which requires both parents to provide support; and an 
anonymous sperm donation, absent sex, resulting in the birth of a 
57 Ferguson v McKiernan 855 A 2d 121 (Pa Super 2004). 
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child.  These opposed extremes produce two distinct views that we 
believe to be self-evident.  In the case of traditional sexual 
reproduction, there simply is no question that the parties to any 
resultant conception and birth may not contract between themselves to 
deny the child the support he or she requires….  In the institutional 
sperm donation case, however, there appears to be a growing 
consensus that clinical, institutional sperm donation neither imposes 
obligations nor confers privileges upon the sperm donor.  Between 
these poles lies a spectrum of arrangements that exhibit characteristics 
of each extreme to varying degrees—informal agreements between 
friends to conceive a child via sexual intercourse; non-clinic non-
sexual insemination; and so on.” 
 
The Ferguson majority recognized that, “locating future cases on this 
spectrum may call upon courts to draw very fine lines, (but) courts are no 
strangers to such tasks. . . .”  Where the Jacob facts would fall on this 
spectrum is difficult, if not impossible, to conclude with any certainty. 
As in Ferguson, in Jacob there was a known sperm donor and the children 
were conceived through artificial means.  In neither case was the sperm donor 
named as father on the children’s birth certificates.  However, in Jacob it does 
not appear that conception was effected through medical intervention in a 
clinical setting.  In Ferguson, the sperm donor father had never asserted 
visitation rights; in Jacob, the sperm donor father was awarded partial 
custody.  In Ferguson, the sperm donor father had made no contributions to 
the children’s support; in Jacob, the sperm donor father had made 
contributions to the children in excess of $13,000 and had provided the family 
with a car. 
Thus reasonable arguments could be made on both sides of the question of 
whether the Ferguson rationale would be applied to a case such as Jacob. 
Finally, while a decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court trumps a 
decision of the Pennsylvania Superior Court, one must ask which represents 
the better public policy in the absence of clear statutory guidance.  The Jacob 
children ended up with three parental figures from whom they could claim 
support, rather than the customary two.  But the Ferguson children now have 
but one adult from whom they can claim parental responsibilities.  Clearly the 
Jacob, three-parents, court has been more solicitous of the rights of children.  
Although having three parents may well be confusing for any child, it has 
been amply demonstrated that having but one parent significantly heightens 
risks to a child’s financial well-being, as well as physical security.58
 
58 See, generally, American Bar Assoc. Presidential Working Group on the Unmet 
Legal Needs of Children and their Families, America’s Children at Risk (1993). 
